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A transition to a new technological regime is complete (and stable) when 
accompanied with a co-stabilization between the mode of regulation and the regime of 
accumulation. Key to understanding the dynamics of transitions are the factors, 
including institutions, that ￿regulate￿ and stabilize the regime of accumulation over 
time. However, the available frameworks for institutional analysis employ arbitrary 
and narrow definition of institutions, focus mainly on the policy domain, and do not 
pay sufficient attention to the evolutionary characteristics of change as manifested in 
emergence of numerous institutions that underlie transitions. This paper consists of 
three parts. The first part critically reviews and synthesizes some of the main 
approaches for conducting institutional analysis. The second part rearticulates the 
concept of ￿transitions￿, or technological regime shifts, from a systems perspective to 
make a case for investigating transitions as multi-level, multi-scale, and multi-system 
phenomena best understood in their institutional contexts. The third part proposes a 
framework for examining institutional change and demonstrates how this framework 
may be used to identify the key factors and conditions whose convergence might 
result in transitions in a given subsystem. Examples are drawn from the Dutch waste 
management subsystem to demonstrate how this framework should be 
operationalized.   
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1. Introduction 
The mass use of the automobile became socially embedded in a co-evolutionary 
process that saw societies build new infrastructure, set up new formal institutions such 
as licensing agencies, devise new rules such as traffic laws, devise means of coercion 
such as the traffic police, and change consuming behaviour so that the general 
populace wanted (and later needed) automobiles. The emergence of the automobile 
sector also gave rise to the formation of new associations such as carmakers￿ lobby 
groups, mass social organizations such as trade unions, and technical societies all of 
which in turn regulated, in specific and broad terms, the automobile industry and the 
later generations of automotive technologies. The historical dynamics of automobile 
use is captured through the notion of ￿transitions￿. A transition is a transformation 
process through which a new technological regime is established (Kemp, Schot, and 
Hoogma 1998). Transitions are evolutionary phenomena and embodied in systemic 
processes that combine new and old elements to generate a new technological regime.  
Drawing examples from the Dutch waste management subsystem this paper proposes 
a framework for examining institutional change and demonstrates how this framework 
may be used to identify the key factors and conditions whose convergence might have 
resulted in transitions in the subsystem. The proposed framework assumes that in a 
subsystem some institutional variables are more significant than others. This 
assumption allows focusing on the most important variables, simplifies analysis, and 
makes the approach and its findings more accessible. This paper consists of three 
main parts. The first part reviews and synthesizes some of the main approaches for 
conducting institutional analysis. The second part rearticulates the concept of 
transitions, or technological regime shifts, from a systems perspective to make a case 
for investigating transitions as multi-level, multi-scale, and multi-system phenomena 
best understood in their institutional contexts. The third part proposes a framework for 
examining institutional change and demonstrates how this framework may be used to 
identify the key factors and conditions whose convergence might result in transitions 
in a given subsystem. The Dutch waste management subsystem is used to demonstrate 
how this framework should be operationalized. 
2. Review of Frameworks for Institutional Analysis 
Numerous and different types of variables shape the dynamics of a transition in a 
subsystem. A subsystem may be a policy domain, cluster of firms, industrial sector, or 
region. The institution of a transition is closely associated to a set of factors, or 
variables, some of which play more central roles than others. In studies of transitions 
a common difficulty is determining the most significant factors that facilitate and 
subsequently institute a transition. To a large extent this difficulty arises from the 
complex context in which transitions occur. A transition is said to have occurred when 
a technological regime becomes stable and increasingly irreversible, a process that 
may also be referred to as ￿social embeddedness￿ (Granovetter 1985). Social 
embeddedness is facilitated by a multiplicity of formal and informal ￿institutions￿ 
which co-evolve with the emerging technological regime. These institutions are 
manifested as standard patterns of interaction among individuals and groupings of   3
individuals, e.g., organizations, and give rise to distinct modes of behaviour and codes 
of conduct.  
The co-evolution of institutional forms and transitions is complex, many-sided, and 
perhaps comprehensible only after the event. Studies of transitions to inform policy 
must recognize this complexity and begin with an attempt to unpack and drastically 
disaggregate the notion of ￿institution￿, to paraphrase Nelson (1995). Transitions 
institute new power hierarchies, depend on learning (and unlearning), and tend to 
undermine the stability of previous transitions. Thus, institutional analysis of 
transitions needs to recognize the centrality of power in agency-structure relations 
(DiMaggio 1988, Hirsch 1997, Oliver 1991, Perrow 1985, Scott 2001, Stinchcombe 
1997) and the evolutionary nature of economic activity, including the parts played by 
cumulative causation, path-dependency, and lock-in.
2 This means asking concrete or 
many-sided questions, following arguments and processes ￿wherever they lead￿ 
(Sayer 1999), applying several different theoretical perspectives (Stinchcombe 1968), 
and drawing on multiple inputs from diverse disciplines (Ostrom 1999) to ensure the 
adequacy and widespread applicability of the analytical framework. Conducting 
institutional analysis must thus be a multi-scale, multi-level, multi-system, and 
integrated endeavour ￿ that is, no situation or institution should be viewed as 
unrelated to, or fully isolated from, other situations or institutions. 
Institutional configurations should be viewed as nested, hierarchical structures. 
Certainly, simplifications and assumptions need to be made about the internal and 
external factors that affect the domain under study. The frameworks reviewed in the 
next section all make such simplifications. With the exception of Hayden￿s ￿Social 
Fabric Matrix￿ all these frameworks almost exclusively focus on the dynamics of the 
policy-making arena and their implications for societal change. The common thread 
linking these approaches is the varying emphasis placed on the role of institutions in 
societal change.  
2.1 Social Fabric Matrix 
In three papers, Gregory Hayden builds on the institutionalist approaches of Dewey 
(1954), Foster (1981a, 1981b), Swaney (1987), and Mattessich (1978) to outline the 
￿Social Fabric Matrix (SFM)￿ as an analytical method for operationalizing the 
institutionalist approach (Hayden 1982a, 1982b, 1982c). The SFM is used in 
subsequent papers to analyze specific case studies, drawn from the realms of natural 
resources and ecosystem management (Hayden 1991), transactions among 
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inferiority to other arrangements, evolved to become the standard in keyboard arrangement (Liebowitz 
and Margolis 1995:210) or how Microsoft has maintained its hold over the vast personal computer 
market despite the availability of other viable technologies.   4
corporations (Hayden and Stephenson 1992), and policymaking (Hayden 1993). The 
SFM is based on the concept of delivery and process (Hayden 1982b). Electric 
companies ￿deliver￿ electricity, novels deliver myths, values deliver belief criteria, 
and some industries deliver carcinogenic substances. Designing an SFM requires first 
defining the matrix components (table 1). Hayden (1993:308-11) identifies and 
defines seven major components for integration into the SFM. These are cultural 
values, social beliefs, personal attitudes, personal tastes, natural environment, 
technology, and social institutions. The flows of goods, services, information, funds, 
and people through the network represented by SFM, both structure and maintain 
￿community relationships￿. Depending on the subject of study, the SFM may attribute 
more or less weight to each of the seven components. 
An SFM integrating the seven components should, as real-world systems do, depend 
on delivery among the component parts, or elements, denoted by (1..n) for each 
component in table 1. Examples of elements that might be included in the (1..n) range 
are provided in table 2. For example, the natural environment has to be viewed as 
delivering nitrogen-fixing bacteria as well as floods. Similarly, factories deliver 
output as well as generate employment and pollution. The system continues to 
function as long as there is delivery among its components consistent with natural 
principles and social rules. A ￿sustainable￿ system has continuous delivery and 
receipt among its many components and no delivery-receipt relationship undermines 
the continuance of relationships among other components. One main purpose of the 
SFM is to organize what we know as the basis to identify other components and 
linkages. 
TABLE 1 
After the accumulation of relevant knowledge, the task is then to construct a list of the 
main components and elements of the components that make up the real world. 
￿Delivering Components￿ shown in the first column in table 1 correspond with 
￿Receiving Components￿, shown in the first row: ￿Some of the deliveries will include 
criteria, court rulings, pollution emissions, goods production, services, and so forth￿. 
The completion of the SFM for a research problem should result in discovering 
linkages among elements and the identification of research gaps (Hayden 1993:312-
3). Placing a notation of ￿1￿ in any cell in table 1 denotes the existence of a delivery / 
receipt relationships. If there is no relationship, a zero is entered into the appropriate 
cell. The number of cells in the SFM depends on the research or policy problem being 
addressed, i.e., it is scope-dependent. Links or relationships between deliveries and 
receipts are established on the basis of Reciprocity, and/or Redistribution, and/or 
Exchange. 
The information processed to establish delivery / receipt relationships and entered into 
the matrix can be used to define the system sequence. The completed matrix can be 
converted to a Boolean digraph (directed graph) to indicate delivery and receipt 
processes to allow for the identification of the central nodes of the network. Digraphs 
highlight overlapping inter-relations among entities through the flows of personnel, 
funds, goods and services, and information (tacit and codified) which structure and   5
maintain community relationships (Hayden 1993:312). The central nodes are entities 
or phenomena that are involved in more overlaps, have more reachability to other 
entities, and generate greater levels of deliveries, in terms of flows, than other entities 
or phenomena. Using the SFM, it is possible to identify the relevant set of influences 
that shape the behaviour of a system (Hayden 1998:94). As a means to model action 
processes, the SFM can be used to select the most important components, or 
regulatory factors, through highlighting the delivery and receipt relationships. 
Depending on the number and importance of the most central node(s), one might 
speculate about the resilience of the network or the stability of a particular 
institutional arrangement as a whole, were one or more of the central nodes to be 
eliminated or diminish in importance.  
TABLE 2 
Because the SFM has not been widely utilized in empirical work it remains unclear 
how the significance of each variable and its relationships with other variables can be 
determined. Also, despite its inherent usefulness in highlighting the key variables and 
their inter-relations, the SFM provides only a snapshot, albeit a highly elaborate one, 
of institutional arrangements without accounting for the continuous change dynamics 
that characterize institutional arrangements, particularly in times of acute crises. The 
analysis of how institutions change over time is the subject of study for frameworks 
based on ￿Institutional Rational Choice￿ (IRC). IRC is primarily concerned with rule 
changes in the formal institutions of government. A much cited extension of IRC is 
Elinor Ostrom￿s (1999) ￿Institutional Analysis and Development Framework￿(IAD). 
IAD, discussed in the next section, focuses on tracking changes in institutional 
arrangements, evaluation of changes in policy outcomes, and the implications these 
outcomes for future policy. 
2.2 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
Ostrom (1999) describes the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework starting with some working definitions. To deal with the multiplicity of 
meanings for institutions Ostrom (1999) views institutions as ￿shared concepts used 
by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and strategies￿. Rules are 
shared prescriptions based on must, must not, or may which are enforced by agents 
responsible for monitoring conduct and imposing sanctions. Norms are shared 
prescriptions conformed to by the participants through internally and externally 
imposed costs and inducement. Strategies are plans made by individuals based on 
their knowledge of the structure of incentives produced by rules, norms, and 
expectations of behaviour of others (Ostrom 1999:37). Ostrom￿s emphasis on ￿rules-
in-use￿, as opposed to ￿rules-in-form￿, resonates with Nelson and Sampat￿s (2001:40) 
variant of institutionalism which views institutions as ￿how the game is played￿ as 
opposed to North￿s (1990) ￿rules of the game￿. Like Ostrom (1999), Nelson and 
Sampat (2001) make allowances for the internalization by the agents of the rules, 
norms, and expectations of behaviour.   6
The conceptual unit of analysis for IAD is the action arena, which consists of an 
action situation and the actors in that situation. Action arena is the social space where 
individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one 
another, or fight (among the many things that individuals do in action arenas). There 
are seven clusters of variables in an action situation: participants, positions, outcomes, 
action-outcome linkages, the control that participants exercise, information, and the 
costs and benefits assigned to outcomes. An actor is characterized by the resources 
brought into the situation; the valuation the actor assigns to states of the world and to 
actions; the way the actor acquires, processes, retains, and uses knowledge 
contingencies and information; and the processes the actor uses for selection of 
particular courses of action (Ostrom 1999: 41-2). To understand the ￿rules-in-use￿ the 
institutional analyst needs to identify ￿entry and exit rules￿ for the participants; 
￿position rules￿ of the participants; ￿scope rules￿ relating to geographic or functional 
domains as understood by the participants; ￿authority rules￿ from the participants￿ 
perspectives on what is mandatory, forbidden, or authorized; ￿aggregation rules￿ 
relating to permission from or agreement of others on adopting certain practices; 
￿information rules￿ relating to what is proprietary and what is public; and ￿payoff 
rules￿ which determine the type and size of sanctions and incentives and how 
conformance to the rules is monitored (Ostrom 1999:52-3).      
Institutionalist analysis in the manner described by Ostrom (1999) is aimed at 
understanding the initial structure of an action arena, enquiring into factors that affect 
the structure of an action arena, and explaining complex structures that link sequential 
and simultaneous action arenas to one another. The IAD framework in addition 
identifies patterns of interactions and outcomes and evaluates the outcomes (Ostrom 
1999: 41). The predictability of the outcomes depends on the action arena and its 
constituent parts (i.e., the action situation and the actors). In an environmental 
conflict, for example, actor individuals may be embedded in communities where the 
initial norms of fairness and conservation (or the opposite) structure the situation 
dramatically. In these situations, participants (single individuals or organizations) may 
adopt a broader (or narrower) range of strategies. Actors may also change their 
strategies over time as they learn about the results of past actions. Because of the high 
level of uncertainty in such situations, the ability to predict outcomes is significantly 
diminished. Often what is possible is to predict what will not occur, useful when 
reforms are being contemplated (Ostrom 1999:47). The next step in the IAD 
framework is the evaluation of the outcomes being achieved, outcomes that could be 
achieved under alternative institutional arrangements, and the processes of achieving 
outcomes (Ostrom 1999:48). The evaluation criteria are not predetermined but could 
be based on such concerns as economic efficiency, equity, and accountability. Policy 
process evaluation may also be carried out using criteria defined for sustainability, for 
example.
3 The IAD framework may be used to examine multiple action arenas and 
assess change trajectories based on alternative policy scenarios. 
The main principles underlying the IAD framework are a systems view of the policy 
process as complicated and complex, simultaneous focus on the policy process as well 
as outcomes, emphasis on the need to evaluate actual and potential policy outcomes, 
and recognition of the actors￿ intransigence to change their core beliefs (￿deeper level 
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rules￿). Despite its significant contribution to institutional analysis, IAD lacks the 
clarity of some of the other frameworks such as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith￿s (1993, 
1999) ￿Advocacy Coalition Framework￿ (ACF) and Kingdon￿s (1984 [1995]) ￿Policy 
Streams Approach￿ (PSA). In addition, there is an implicit assumption in IAD that 
institutions primarily ￿constrain￿, rather than facilitate, policy change. This one-sided 
view of institutions as constraints is contested by Hodgson (1988), for example, 
among others. Despite the emphasis on the ￿rules-in-use￿ by actors in ￿action 
situations￿, the IAD framework focuses on the actors￿ institutional affiliations to the 
detriment of paying additional and sufficient attention to the dynamics of the action 
situation. The action situation is more extensively analyzed through the ACF and 
PSA. These latter frameworks attach great importance to the politics of policymaking 
and attempt to simplify the ￿messiness￿ of the policy arena. These approaches are 
discussed in the next two sections.  
2.3 Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The policy process according to Sabatier (1999) is ￿an extremely complex set of 
interacting elements over time￿.
4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework of policy 
change (ACF) emerged in part out of a ￿desire to synthesize the best features of the 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation￿ and ￿a commitment to 
incorporate technical information into a more prominent role in our understanding of 
the policy process￿ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999:117). Because of complexity 
and ￿complicated situations￿, analytical work in policy ￿subsystems￿ (or domains) 
necessarily has to be based on a series of assumptions about what variables and which 
causal relations are more important than others. These assumptions constitute the 
conceptual lens for the analyst. The point of departure for Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993, 1999) is that since conceptual lenses are inevitable (because of complexity), 
analysts should be explicit rather than implicit about their assumptions so as to ￿invite 
critical scrutiny of their key variables and causal relationships in terms of their logical 
properties ￿ clarity, logical consistency, scope, fruitfulness ￿ and in terms of the 
receptivity of their principal propositions to empirical verification￿ (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993:xi). Discourse on adequacy or inadequacy of conceptual lenses 
could then be expected to lead to revision, retesting, and sometimes rejection of 
underlying assumptions. 
                                                           
4 Sabatier (1999:3-4) summarizes the reasons for this complexity as follows: 
•  involvement by (often) hundreds of public and private interest actors (with counterposing values 
and perceptions) in some or all aspects of the policy process; 
•  outcomes of policy debates given counterposing values and perceptions of actors involved; 
•  relatively long time span of a decade or more that characterizes the entire policy process ￿ from the 
emergence of a problem through to the formation of policy and learning from the evaluation of 
policy impact; 
•  multiplicity of policy programs and the scales at, through, and over which the programs are 
intended to operate make for situations with considerable overlaps among programs and different 
geographical, social, economic, and political domains; and 
•  power, due to conviction based on deeply held values and interests, wealth and money, and 
authoritative coercion ￿ hegemonic quests by actors are often manifest as selectivity in presenting 
evidence, misrepresentation of opponents￿ positions, coercion to discredit opponents, and 
distortion of the policy debate process to one￿s own advantage.   8
A ￿subsystem￿ consists of groups of individuals and / or organizations (actors) 
organized into ￿advocacy coalitions￿ that interact regularly over periods of a decade 
or longer to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy 
area or domain.
5 An advocacy coalition consists of a set of actors who share a set of 
basic beliefs and values (policy goals). The actors within a coalition are affiliated with 
a variety of public and private institutions but collectively seek to manipulate the 
rules, budgets, and personnel of governmental institutions to achieve their own 
coalition￿s policy goals over time. Actors in a coalition are unified with the intent to 
address specific issue(s) or aspect(s) of an issue but can differ significantly in the 
contents of their moral, cultural, and ideological baggage. Sabtatier (1999: 133) refers 
to this baggage as the ￿Belief System of the Policy Elites￿. A belief system comprises 
a deep core, a policy core, and secondary aspects. Deep core is defined as 
fundamental normative and ontological axioms that run through all policy 
subsystems. Changes in the deep core are very difficult and akin to ￿a religious 
conversion￿. To demonstrate, it would be extremely difficult to convince a Hindu 
member of an anti-hunger coalition in India that consumption of beef should be 
considered as means to significantly alleviate food shortage problems. It would be 
similarly unlikely for a member of an anti-poverty coalition belonging to upper 
echelons of the status quo to forgo the material comforts of life in the developed 
world to alleviate poverty problems in developing countries.    
The policy core is subsystem wide. Policy core comprises fundamental policy 
positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving core values within the 
subsystem. Changes in the policy core are difficult but more likely than changes in the 
deep core. Examples include understanding of cause-effect relationships and policy 
preferences. Secondary aspects refer to instrumental decisions and information 
searches necessary to implement policy core. Secondary aspects are associated with 
parts of the subsystem and are moderately easy to change. Examples include 
perceptions of seriousness of specific aspects of a problem in a specific locale and 
importance of various causal linkages in different locales and over time. Changes in 
secondary aspects are the focus for most administrative and legislative policy-making. 
Based on this categorization of the ￿Belief System￿, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993, 1999) describe (policy) change as being a function of three sets of processes. 
The first concerns the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy 
subsystem. Second, changes external to the policy subsystem under study (i.e., 
changes to the socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, and 
output from other subsystems) provide opportunities and obstacles to competing 
actors. Third, there are relatively stable system parameters, e.g., social culture, basic 
distribution of resources, constitutional rules, which determine the constraints and 
resources of the various subsystem actors. 
The ACF is concerned with examining changes in the belief systems of policy actors 
over the long-term; the dynamics of advocacy coalition formation and stability of 
policy subsystems; the role of factors, actors, or events exogenous to the policy 
subsystem in changing the belief system; and the conditions under which policy 
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analogous to Ostrom￿s (1999) ￿action arena￿.   9
learning occurs across coalitions of the policy subsystem. The framework is based on 
five premises: 
•  The availability, diffusion, absorption, and utilization of information-in-context is 
instrumental in the policy process and policy change; 
•  To account for learning and changes in actors￿ belief systems, a period of a decade 
or longer needs to be examined to understand the process of policy change; 
•  The most useful unit of analysis in policy analysis is a policy subsystem (or 
domain), consisting of actors from a variety of public and private organizations, 
concerned with an issue, and actively seeking to influence public policy in that 
domain; 
•  The policy subsystem should include actors from all levels of government 
(governance), administrative agencies, legislative committees, interest groups, 
journalists, researchers, and policy analysts; 
•  Theories, implicit or explicit, underlie perceptions of a problem and how to 
address it. Theories determine value priorities, perceptions of important causal 
relationships, perception of world states, and perceptions or assumptions about the 
efficacy of various policy instruments. 
One of the main advantages of the ACF over Ostrom￿s (1999) IAD is that the ACF 
pays much closer attention to the evolutionary dynamics of change in policy and 
institutional arrangements and underlines the role of learning within and among 
advocacy coalitions. The IAD and ACF are both useful for describing how change 
does or might occur without making sufficient provisions to specify ￿why￿. The 
question of why policy and institutional change occur is more extensively addressed 
through the ￿Policy Streams Approach￿, discussed next.    
2.4 Policy Streams Approach 
The starting point for Kingdon￿s (1984) ￿Policy Streams Approach￿ (PSA) is that in 
the policy process one encounters ￿considerable doses of messiness, accident, 
fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck￿. However, despite a certain degree of 
unpredictability it would be ￿a grave mistake to conclude that [policy processes] are 
essentially random￿ (Kingdon 1995:206). The PSA resolves to understand why 
participants in a policy process deal with certain issues and neglect others. The 
emphasis is thus placed on agenda setting and alternative specification (Kingdon 
1995, John 1998, Zahariadis 1999). PSA draws on earlier works on bounded 
rationality to explain (￿irrational￿) individual behaviour in light of new information, 
systems approaches to recognize the complexity that results from the interaction 
among numerous endogenous and exogenous factors, chaos theory to account for a 
significant degree of randomness, and punctuated equilibria to denote the continuous 
and evolutionary characteristics of the policy process. 
Whereas Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) refer to ￿complicated situations￿ to 
describe the policy process, Kingdon expands on Cohen, March and Olsen￿s (1972) 
￿garbage can theory￿ to articulate ￿messiness￿ as the defining characteristic. 
Messiness is a product of the pulls and pushes of endogenous and exogenous factors, 
participants not knowing or adequately articulating what they want, and time   10
constraints forcing instant, often unclear, decisions. Other factors such as lack of 
knowledge about the roles of others in the same situation, unclear jurisdictional 
boundaries, lack of top-down and bottom-up systems of accountability, and turf 
battles further intensify the messiness of the policy process while creating an 
operational environment prone to trial-and-error procedures as indispensable learning 
tools (Zahariadis 1999). That certain issues are attended to instead of or prior to others 
is ￿a function of opportunity, bias, formal position in an organization or government, 
and the number of issues competing for policymakers￿ attention￿ (March and 
Romelaer 1976, cited in Zahariadis 1999:76). 
The PSA focuses on ￿agenda setting￿ and ￿alternative specification￿ as ￿predecision￿ 
processes. Agenda setting narrows down the range of objectives for decision makers 
for practical reasons. Agenda objectives are set based on problems requiring policy-
makers￿ attention. Problems are brought to the attention of policy-makers by political 
activists and interest group lobbyists. Numerous people participate in the policy-
making process including presidents and prime ministers, members of parliament, 
civil servants, lobbyists, journalists, and academics. All or some of these participants 
drive the processes for problem recognition, proposal formation, and politics. Agenda 
objectives can contain numerous specialized agendas within them. In the policy-
making process some specialized agenda items gain prominence and are attended to 
while others are neglected. Key to understanding the causes of this ongoing selection 
process is finding out ￿who affects agendas and alternatives, and why they do￿ 
(Kingdon 1995:196). The context for the policy process is defined by the three 
streams of problems, policies, and politics, each with its own process. 
Problems come to the attention of decision makers through indicators, e.g., incidence 
of a disease or high costs of a programme; ￿focusing event￿, e.g., a disaster, crisis, 
personal experience, or powerful symbol; and feedback on programme performance 
or public complaints about a specific issue. Following problem identification, certain 
approaches gain ascendancy over others. The selection of alternatives to meet policy 
objective is directly related to the actions of ￿policy entrepreneurs￿ who ￿invest 
considerable resources bringing their conception of problems to officials￿ attention, 
and trying to convince them to see problems their way￿ (Kingdon 1995:198). Politics 
represent another stream in the PSA. This stream has its own set of dynamics 
including political events, elections, changes in the public mood and of dominant 
ideologies, and the activities and tactics of interest groups to press for certain policy 
directions. The politics stream also defines the mood to fund or withdraw funds from 
certain programmes. In a democracy agreements in the politics stream are built 
through bargaining. However, the confluence of the national mood and election 
results often proves formidable in deciding and setting the agenda. 
Once the agenda has been set ￿alternatives, proposals, and solutions are generated in 
communities of specialists ￿[including] academics, researchers, consultants, career 
bureaucrats, congressional staffers, and analysts who work for interest groups￿ 
(Kingdon 1995:200). Communities of specialists form loosely knit communities made 
up of people with diverse interests spread across a wide range of organizations and 
institutions. Specialist community members often only share their specialization and   11
acquaintance with the issues in a particular policy area.
6 The policy stream is 
characterized as a selection process in a ￿primeval soup... [where] many ideas float 
around, bumping into one another, encountering new ideas, and forming combinations 
and recombinations￿. Through the selection process certain order and patterns 
develop based on technical feasibility, congruence with the values of community 
members, and the anticipation of future constraints, including a budget constraint, 
public acceptability, and politicians￿ receptivity (Kingdon 1995:200). 
From time to time, the problem, policy, and politics streams are joined together as a 
result of ￿an open window of opportunity￿, e.g., a significant change in the 
government or a new problem that can be matched with an existing proposed solution. 
Joining occurs in the main by policy entrepreneurs ￿in and around government [who] 
keep their proposals and their problems at hand, waiting for these opportunities to 
occur￿ (Kingdon 1995:203). Windows of opportunity can open unexpectedly or 
predictably but are always small, scarce, and short-lived.
7 Policy entrepreneurs strive 
to ￿couple￿ their solution to problems and politics that may be floating in the primeval 
soup, ￿knowing that the chances for enactment are considerably enhanced if they can 
complete the circle [linking problem, policy, and politics]￿ (page 204) or take 
advantage of a ￿lock-in￿. An open window may result from the culmination of path-
dependent, historical developments, or co-developments. Windows may also become 
manifest as a result of ￿cumulative causation￿, which is closely associated with the 
better-known economic concept, the multiplier effect. Open window may also result 
from random events.  
The two main characteristics of the PSA are the focus on the political (in the broadest 
sense) dimensions of policy making and the explicitly systems-based view of the 
policy process. The PSA seems to go further than the IAD and the ACF in explaining 
why some policy objectives are adopted while others are dropped and why certain 
measures are implemented while others remain on the drawing board. Perhaps 
because of its decidedly exploratory and mostly inductive approach, the PSA 
methodology and methods are readily generalizable across a variety of policy 
domains or other subsystems. 
2.5 Synthesis 
Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of the analytical frameworks reviewed 
above. Institutional analysis requires considerable simplification of the inherent 
complexities of the policy realm. Among other functions, a framework should 
simplify the messiness that characterizes the policy arena / domain / subsystem to 
facilitate in-depth analysis. Simplification is carried out for different frameworks 
based on a series of assumptions or foci. The intent of this summary table is to allow 
comparison of the main underlying assumptions.  
                                                           
6 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) use the term ￿advocacy coalitions￿ to refer to the 
identifiable presence of specialist communities in the policy subsystem. 
7 ￿Short-lived￿, if not interpreted in evolutionary terms, is inconsistent with the notion of ￿lock-in￿. 
See, for example, Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) in footnote 2.   12
TABLE 3 
The choice of framework for institutional analysis depends on the purpose of the 
analysis being conducted. For example, Hayden￿s ￿Social Fabric Matrix (SFM)￿ is 
quite useful as a means to identify the main actors and map the inter-relations among 
them in a given subsystem, or even to determine the boundaries of a subsystem based 
on inter-relations among entities.
8 Elinor Ostrom￿s ￿Institutional Analysis and 
Development￿ (IAD) framework seems to satisfy many of the concerns raised by 
Nelson and Sampat (2001) and Scott (2001) as it focuses on how ￿the game￿ is 
played, paying attention to action arenas where actors and action situations generate 
quite specific patterns of interaction and outcome. The politics of the policy process 
are most explicitly explored through Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith￿s (1993, 1999) 
￿Advocacy Coalition Framework￿ (ACF) and Kingdon￿s (1984 [1995]) ￿policy 
steams approach￿ (PSA). To varying degrees the ACF and the PSA focus on causal 
relationships between key variables to explain ￿why￿ certain policy outcomes occur 
and how the policy subsystem evolves over time.  
To varying degrees the approaches summarized in table 3 underline the inseparability 
of governance and institutional analysis by drawing attention to the formal and 
informal structures that constitute the governance dynamics of a given subsystem. To 
capture this link explicitly, we might state that governance consists of the formal and 
informal institutional devices through which political and economic actors organize 
and manage their interdependencies. Interdependencies can arise in individual-to-
individual, individual-to-firm, firm-to-firm, firm-to-state, and state-to-state relations. 
Governance structures organize negotiation processes, set standards, perform 
allocative functions, monitor compliance, reduce conflict, and resolve disputes among 
actors (Eden and Hampson 1997: 362) to establish stable regimes of accumulation, a 
necessary condition for a transition to be firmly instituted. As such, governance 
structures work through socio-economic, political, and ecological systems to 
determine the nature of inter-relations (based on interdependencies) at the individual, 
intra- and inter-organizational, and societal levels. In light of this complexity the next 
section rearticulates the concept of transitions, or technological regime shifts, from a 
systems perspective to make a case for investigating transitions as multi-level, multi-
scale, and multi-system phenomena best understood in their institutional contexts. 
3. Transitions and Institutional Analysis 
The concept of transition is firmly rooted in the development of complex systems 
(Nicolis and Prigogine 1977, 1989) according to which under certain conditions, open 
systems with a gradient across their boundaries will move away from equilibrium and 
will establish new stable structures (Kay 1991). The development of complex systems 
is characterized by phases of rapid organization leading to steady states, which after a 
period of relative calm tend to lose their stability and move toward rapid 
reorganization to constitute a new steady state. The organization / disorganization / 
reorganization process that characterizes a given (sub)system may be continuous or 
catastrophic but is in both cases evolutionary in that at no time all total system 
                                                           
8 See, for example, Munkirs (1985).   13
components are ￿stationary￿. In addition, each new state has elements or remnants of 
past states and thus there are no entirely ￿new￿ states. Some steady states may be 
more stable than others, however. A transition is thus said to occur when a new 
(significantly different) dynamic equilibrium is reached (Rotmans, Kemp, and van 
Asselt 2001). The occurrence of a transition should be traceable to a series of inter-
related institutional changes. 
A societal transition usually takes 25 years or longer and results from a coming 
together of a set of developments in different domains to constitute a new end state 
significantly different from the previous state(s). The process of change is non-linear, 
analogous to the development of Kay￿s (1991) ￿thermodynamic branch￿. The path in 
figure 2A depicts a subsystem that develops along a thermodynamic branch toward an 
￿optimum operating point￿ where the organizing and disorganizing forces neutralize 
each other. Changes in the total system cause a movement from the steady state 
operating point to a new optimum operating point (figure 1B, 2). This is equivalent to 
moving to an earlier, less stable, ￿successional￿ stage. In figure 2B, the subsystem is 
more volatile at point 2 than at point 1. If this new balance is further disturbed, due to 
additional changes in the larger system, for example, the subsystem can move away, 
through a bifurcation, from the original thermodynamic branch onto a new branch and 
onto a new optimum operating point (figure 1C, 3). Kay (1991) refers to these 
transitions as ￿flips￿ in the system. 
FIGURE 1 
Rotmans et al. (2001) hypothesize that transitions consist of the following stages: 
•  A predevelopment phase of dynamic equilibrium where the status quo does not 
visibly change. 
•  A take-off phase where the process of change gets under way because the state of 
the system begins to shift. 
•  A breakthrough phase where visible structural changes take place through an 
accumulation of socio-cultural, economic, ecological and institutional changes 
that react to each other. During the acceleration phase, there are collective 
learning processes, diffusion and embedding processes.  
•  A stabilization phase where the speed of social change decreases and a new 
dynamic equilibrium is reached. 
In the predevelopment phase structures, routines, and repetitions characterize the 
subsystem and provide a certain degree of predictability of events. The onset of 
change is evidenced through the occurrence of unprecedented events, a weakening of 
existing structures, and decreased repetition. The emergence and establishment of new 
structures and routines mark the beginnings of a new institutional order closely 
associated with a new stable dynamic equilibrium. These phases are fully consistent 
with the development of ￿thermodynamic branches￿ (figure 1). A transition may be 
said to have fully occurred every time an optimum operating point is instituted in the 
subsystem. The subsystem may be an ecosystem (Kay 1991, 1994), a policy domain,   14
or a system of production.
9 The evolution of a subsystem can be traced by using the 
transition / non-equilibrium thermodynamic framework. Both methodologies draw 
substantially on complex systems analysis and evolutionary biology. Similarly, 
evolutionary economists view economic change as the outcome of processes of 
variation and selection in which there is heredity and recombination of technologies, 
ideas, practices, routines, structures, organizations, and institutions. Technical 
advances or transitions are part of trajectories and practices that are embedded and 
reproduced in social (sub)systems.  
FIGURE 2 
The adoption by existing systems and organizations of innovations and new 
technology can sometimes result in dramatic changes in the total system. It has to be 
noted that change, however fundamental, can often be related to a previous path and a 
specific set of variables. For example, Kemp et al. (1994) define a technological 
regime
10 as the complex consisting of the following variables: scientific knowledge, 
engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, user 
practices, skills and procedures, institutions, and infrastructure. Similarly, Rip and 
Kemp (1998) define a technological regime as the grammar, or rule-set, embedded in 
the coherent complex of a technology (or mode of manufacturing), which structures 
the search activities of engineers and the policies and actions of other technology 
actors (including public authorities). Changes in one or more of the variables that 
constitute the technological regime could result in a movement between optimum 
operating points within the subsystem (technological regime). 
Transformation from one optimum operating point to the next is often the product of 
the co-evolution of a set of slow changes, the changes in system factors (variables) 
that determine the undercurrent for a fundamental change. Superimposed on this 
undercurrent are events such as calamities that might, under certain conditions, 
accelerate the transformation process. A transition may be accelerated by one-time 
events, such as a war or large accidents, e.g., Chernobyl, or a crisis, e.g., the 1970s 
energy crisis. Larger system changes often cause disturbances at the subsystem scale 
and could result in a bifurcation (figure 1C). The frameworks summarized in table 3 
may be used to identify the key factors whose convergence might have resulted in 
transitions as manifested in a subsystem, e.g., the Dutch waste management or the 
Swedish mobile telecommunication subsystems. The ACF and PSA approaches can 
be used to ￿simplify￿ the complicated institutional and organizational landscape by 
identifying actors based primarily on their association with an advocacy coalition 
(ACF) or a ￿stream￿ (PSA) in a given subsystem. 
The ACF treats the institutional affiliation of the actors as a secondary consideration 
in explaining the dynamics of change in the policy subsystem while the PSA 
                                                           
9 In this paper metaphors and examples drawn from biology and ecology are used insofar as they 
deepen appreciation and understanding of socio-economic complexities. This selective utilization of 
other disciplines is consistent with Nelson and Winter￿s (1982:11) ￿Lamarchian￿ approach. 
10 Here, a technological regime is the optimum operating point in the domain, or subsystem, where the 
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submerges institutions into the problem, policy, and politics streams. Neither of these 
two approaches is explicit on the role played by institutions in defining what occurs in 
a subsystem. A major part of institutional analysis should be concerned with 
identifying the multiplicity of institutions that regulate what occurs in a given 
subsystem at different levels of inter-relation. This is depicted in the column headed 
￿Direction of RØgulation￿ in table 4. Positive and negative feedback through inter-
relations exist between all elements in the third column of this table. From an 
evolutionary, dialectical perspective the feedback loops are best described by the 
￿cause-effect-cause￿ notion whereby a cause is seen to be the product of a previous, 
related effect. The direction of each the arrows indicates the sequence in the Cause-
Effect-Cause continuum. Table 4 is intended to provide a loose but necessary 
structure to identify and categorize institutions. The task of institutional analysis 
should begin with finding empirical examples for the institution types listed in table 4. 
The resulting inventory should facilitate establishing linkages between different types 
of institution within the subsystem under study. The inventory will also allow 
examining the manner in which the identified institutions ￿mature￿ and transform into 
other institutions. 
TABLE 4 
For example, business networks are usually characterized by certain values and codes 
of conduct. If the network persists over time the members of the network internalize 
some of the values and most, if not all, of the codes of conduct become predictable 
routines. The internalization process occurs concurrently with the emergence of new 
or reinforced behavioural traits among the network members. Depending on the 
balance of power within the system of governance (among other factors) the business 
network may succeed in effecting societal change. At this point the network may be 
thought of as both ￿associative￿ for its network characteristics and ￿constitutive￿ for 
its ability to institutionalize at a societal level its values and codes of conduct. The 
evolution and blending of institutional forms define the conditions underlying the 
￿transaction￿ between two or more wills in the economic system as they affect the 
acts of giving, taking, persuading, coercing, defrauding, commanding, obeying, 
competing, and governing (Commons 1950). 
Institutions thus shape transactions among economic agents and are best viewed as 
multifaceted, durable but evolving social structures, made up of symbolic elements, 
social activities, and material resources. Institutions spread across systems, e.g., socio-
economic, political, and ecological systems; operate at all scales of governance, e.g., 
local, provincial, national; and define inter-relations at all levels, i.e., the individual, 
organizational, institutional, and societal. Key to evolutionary institutional analysis is 
the identification of institution types and their role in effecting movement from one 
period of stability to the next. The typology in table 4 should be used to arrange the 
institutions of a subsystem into manageable groups based on their functions and how 
they facilitate or curtail change within that subsystem. 
For a given subsystem long-term belief changes over time need to be identified and 
documented. To remain within the realm of the widely accepted scientific approach,   16
the data may be used to test hypotheses based on Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith￿s (1993, 
1999) work and other policy studies. Another possibility is to adopt a post-
disciplinary and inductive approach.
11  In either case, the questions to be addressed 
must concern the dynamics of coalition formation and stability, the extent to which 
beliefs and strategies change over time and why, the role of exogenous and 
endogenous factors or ￿events￿ in the evolution of the subsystem, and the conditions 
that generate policy-oriented learning within and across coalitions of the same 
subsystem to result in transitions. Apart from the in-depth review of secondary data 
sources, semi-structured interviews should be held with ￿coalition leaders￿ or key 
informants in the subsystem under study. The review of the secondary data can reveal 
the variables (or ￿events￿) of the subsystem and point to well documented belief or 
value changes over time while interviews with key informants can be expected to 
illuminate the dynamics of change in key variables and the more subtle details of how 
a transition becomes firmly instituted. 
From a policy perspective, effecting change is contingent on the degree of control by 
change implementers on the most significant variables. A key component of action-
oriented institutional analysis is thus to identify the most significant variables of the 
subsystem.  Factors (variables) instrumental in effecting a transition are best 
characterized as multi-system, multi-scale, and multi-level. To do meaningful 
institutional analysis of transitions and to investigate context steering opportunities in 
relation to ￿desirable￿ outcomes this complexity needs to be simplified 
considerably.
12 Findings from conducting analyses of transitions need not fit neatly 
into the ￿S￿ curve shape in figure 3. Indeed because the notion of transitions remains 
at the conceptual stage, evolutionary institutional analysis should be used to test the 
validity of the ￿S￿ curve hypothesis.  
Transitions become apparent when one compares different periods of stability through 
historical accounts accompanied with quantitative empirical data. Following Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith (1999) the proposed analytical framework views the Dutch waste 
management arena as a subsystem so as to make explicit account of interdependencies 
and interconnections. The waste management subsystem is viewed much in the same 
way as Kingdon (1984) viewed the aviation industry in the United States, for 
example. That is, this research will be concerned with identifying problems, policies, 
and politics to explain when, how, and why significant changes have occurred in the 
Dutch waste management subsystem over time. The increased knowledge on the 
dynamics of change is expected to increase understanding of the interplays between 
institutional dynamics and transitions and should offer much in the way of learning 
for policy-making purposes and for further research into how and why transitions 
occur.  
                                                           
11 Much has been written about the merits / demerits of inductive and deductive approaches. The 
methodological approach proposed here is a ￿hybrid￿ that leans rather more toward the inductive end 
of the inductive / deductive spectrum. See Parto (2003b) and Parto and Doloreux (2003) for 
applications of this approach. 
12 However, simplifications must be rigorously reviewed and reassessed to avoid redundancy of 
assumptions and to ensure sound analysis.   17
In identifying and documenting transitions, the proposed framework pays particular 
attention to the processes of change in the primary, secondary, and tertiary belief 
system values of the subsystem￿s actors. Primary belief system variables span within 
and outside the subsystem and are the most difficult to change. Examples include 
religious or ethnic beliefs on fundamental issues such as human domination over 
nature or equity and equality. Secondary variables are subsystem specific and concern 
the strategies for addressing the shared problem. Secondary variables may be 
expressed as ideological positions on strategy and policy instruments, e.g., 
government regulation versus voluntary self-regulation, to address the shared 
problem. Tertiary variables are associated with the technical and administrative parts 
of the subsystem. That is, tertiary variables are concerned with how strategies are 
implemented. As such tertiary variables are continually tested, debated, and thus 
prone to change more easily and frequently than primary and secondary belief system 
variables.
13 Changes in the primary, secondary, and tertiary variables are directly 
traceable to changes in different types of institution as defined in table 4. 
To illustrate, learning from the trials and errors of policy implementation to address 
groundwater contamination continually presents the subsystem actors with 
opportunities to learn, debate, and potentially change opinions. A change of approach 
in policy implementation based on new learning represents a tertiary variable change 
and may affect secondary variables. The secondary variables may change in response 
to learning that self-regulation by industry to protect groundwater does not in fact 
work and is prone to abuse by free-riders. A change in the secondary variables within 
the subsystem may be to agree to constrain water-polluting activities through 
legislation. Such a constraint does not question the supremacy of the market or put 
environmental protection before economic gain. Over sufficiently long periods of 
time and accompanied with technological advances, secondary variable changes could 
be reversed in light of new information or raise questions about deeply held beliefs 
(primary variables) such as the legitimacy of human domination over the natural 
environment. In the case of the Dutch waste management subsystem the task then is 
to establish what changes over time and in which primary, secondary, and tertiary 
variables preceded the shifts in the technological regime. 
An important part of studying transitions is forming intuition based on studying 
historical accounts of developments in a given subsystem. A cursory overview of the 
Dutch waste management subsystem since 1900 reveals at least two transitions and 
the beginnings of a third one. The first transition signalled a move from unregulated 
handling of waste to centralized systems of collection and disposal. This transition 
was to a significant degree facilitated through a massive state sponsored construction 
programme to prepare the infrastructure for handling the collected waste, 
accompanied with new rules, forms, and norms. The first transition stabilized between 
the 1920s and the 1960s. The second transition began in the 1970s and was to a large 
extent related to widespread concerns about the state of the environment. This 
transition was characterized by a move from centralized disposal to central 
                                                           
13 Primary, secondary, and tertiary belief system values are almost identical to Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith￿s (1999) ￿deep core￿, ￿policy core￿, and ￿secondary aspects￿, respectively. The definitions used 
here also draw on Ostrom￿s (1999) ￿rules￿ (mutually understood shared prescriptions on must, must 
not, and may), ￿norms￿ (mutually enforced shared prescriptions), and ￿strategies￿ (regularized plans by 
individuals within the structure of incentives produced by rules, norms, and expectations of others).      18
management of waste and was preceded and accompanied by significant changes in 
production and consumption patterns. The stabilization period for the second 
transition seems to have commenced in the late 1970s and ended by the mid 1990s. It 
may be suggested that a third transition, or a period of turbulence preceding a new 
transition, may have started in the early 1990s. The evidence includes new EU 
directives on waste management, a significant drop in the total volume of non-
separated household waste from the peak 1995 level, doubts about the health effects 
of incinerating waste, and the ￿entrepreneurial￿ drive to take advantage of weakly 
regulated waste management subsystems of the former eastern bloc countries as cost 
effective alternatives to managing wastes domestically. 
The evolution of the Dutch waste management subsystem can be described in terms 
of changes in the behaviour of agents (reflected in a change in tertiary variables in the 
waste subsystem) and in the structure of the political economy (reflecting a change in 
the secondary variables). One may also underline changes in perceptions of waste, 
emergence of mental (cognitive institutions) models and laws (regulative institutions) 
on how to deal with waste, changes in behaviour by individuals and organizations to 
act more responsibly toward waste (behavioural and constitutive institutions), and the 
stratification of public and private actors through the formation of alliances and 
interest groups (associative institutions). 
Thus, researching transitions has to focus on discovering events, inter-relations, 
phenomena, or situations as they occur over time in a reasonably well defined 
subsystem. The limitations of the methodology thus far presented are directly 
dependent on the manner in which the enquiry is conducted and determined by how 
the researcher thinks and operates based on political conviction, philosophical 
orientation, and (concrete and discrete) technical abilities (Greene and Caracelli 
1996). Political convictions determine the implicit or explicit value-based purpose of 
conducting research while the philosophical orientation determines which paradigm(s) 
and methods are drawn upon to conduct an inquiry. Regardless of political 
convictions and philosophical orientation, the effectiveness of various field methods 
(e.g., surveys, interviews, document reviews, time-series comparisons, measurements) 
depends, among other factors, on the ability of the researcher to apply them (Hessler 
1997). Personal skills, social setting, level of trust, and even the ideological climate 
can and do advance or curtail obtaining reliable research data. Personal or 
professional relations with the subject of study could also determine research strategy 
and outcomes. 
The next section illustrates how the proposed framework to study transitions may be 
operationalized to identify the key variables and the conditions whose convergence 
might have resulted in transitions in the Dutch waste management subsystem.    19
4. Institutions and Variables of the Dutch Waste Management Subsystem
14 
Based on what has been described thus far, the evolution of the Dutch waste 
management subsystem can be traced to changes in institutions over time. It is also 
possible to account for changes in the tertiary, secondary, and primary variables of the 
subsystem. The task of identifying the subsystem￿s institutions requires grouping the 
institutions according to the typology in table 4. The grouping of institutions under 
Associative, Behavioural, Cognitive, Constitutive, and Regulative types allows close 
examination of how institutions evolve over time. In some cases it is possible to trace 
the evolution of one institutional form to another. For example, a mental model (a 
cognitive institution) on waste hierarchy emerged as the Lansink￿s Memorandum in 
1979. An institutionalization process characterized by public information initiatives, 
financial incentives, structural change, and legislation led to the transformation of the 
Memorandum to an elaborate business model (a constitutive institution) and widely 
adopted by industry in the 1980s.  
TABLE 5 
Hence, rather than showing how institutions are created, table 5 should serve to 
demonstrate how, once in existence, institutions evolve over time to regulate 
economic activity. Key to understanding why transitions occur is to identify the key 
institutions that come into existence, change in response to, and/or reflect (and 
deflect) the impact of identifiable ￿events￿ such as the energy shortage or 
groundwater contamination issues in the 1970s, significant changes in production and 
consumption patterns, and the emergence of liberalized markets in the 1980s. These 
events have acted as triggers and/or catalysts for a series of institutionalization 
processes that have evolved over time to mutate into additional institutions to 
structure inter-relations at different levels. Phenomena such as the Lansink￿s Ladder 
simultaneously structure inter-relations at the individual, intra- and inter-
organizational, and societal levels, for example. Perceived in this manner, the 
evolution of the Dutch waste management subsystem may be described in cause-
effect-cause terms as follows.  
Over time the Dutch waste management subsystem has been subjected to a series of 
endogenous and exogenous ￿events￿. An Event is defined as the combined impact of 
one or more dependent or independent and endogenous or exogenous variable(s). 
Once occurred, an event may set in motion and catalyze a series of institutionalization 
processes resulting in the emergence of distinct and identifiable institution types as 
exemplified in table 5. An event may be the product of one or more of the following 
variables:  
•  Government Legal Act * 
•  Government Policy * 
•  Regulation 
•  Ordinance 
•  Educational and/or public relations initiatives 
                                                           
14 This section has benefited from numerous exchanges with Abraham Garcia, RenØ Kemp, and Derk 
Loorbach.   20
•  Emergence of Covenants (rise of voluntary initiatives and carrot & stick 
inducement technique) 
•  Emergence and identification of new problems (e.g., the air pollution / health 
effects of incineration, dioxin contamination) 
•  Milestone events such as formation of alliances to demand, or respond to, 
regulations and ordinances by various stakeholders (NGOs, larger community, 
firms, unions, EU, etc.) 
•  Market evolution, e.g., development of new waste product niches; changed 
consumption and production patterns; market liberalization 
•  Emergence of new technology developed for or adopted by the waste 
management subsystem 
•  Emergence of new knowledge about waste from waste-related and 
independent research conducted by research and academic institutions (on the 
health impacts of waste management practices, for example) 
•  Other 
 
Significance for each Event could be calculated based on the weights associated with 
that Event. In the following categories, higher weight values indicate higher degrees 
of importance: 
•  Scale (geopolitical, e.g., municipal, provincial, national, continental, 
international). Each scale is given a number. The weight of 1 may be attributed 
to municipal, 2 to provincial, and so on. If a national Event applies at the 
provincial and municipal jurisdictions, the values for municipal, provincial, 
and are added up to make up the weight for Scale. 
 
•  Scope (the range and types of waste covered). Each waste type is attributed a 
number based on the volume, the socio-environmental impacts, and ability to 
prevent adverse impacts. We may attribute the following weights: 
Packaging Waste = 1 
Solid Waste (Industrial) = 2 
Solid Waste (Households) = 3 
Where there is more than one waste type the attributed numbers for each waste 
are added up to make up the weight for scope. 
•  Citation in other ￿Events￿ (including other regulations). Citation could be 





Almost Always (value=4) 
Always (value=5) 
 
•  Longevity (of event). This could be described with ranges, e.g.: 
1-5 years (value=1) 
6-10 years (value=2) 
11-15 years (value=3) 
etc.   21
Significance is calculated by multiplying the weights:  
Significance of Event = Scale X Scope X Citation X Longevity 
15 
Attributing a numerical value for Significance to each Event allows for ranking the 
Events in order of importance. The Events with the highest Significance may be said 
to be the most important variables in the waste management subsystem. The top 4 or 5 
Events may then be selected for further observation to determine whether or not 
changes in the value of one or more of the Events are of consequence in the evolution 
of the subsystem. 
The top 4 or 5 Events may also be used to run different scenarios by altering the 
Significance attributed to each Event ￿ perhaps to find out which Event(s) help 
stabilize a transition and which prolong the developmental stages. Running different 
scenarios could reveal the key Events. The identification of key Events is expected to 
serve the policy decision-making process. 
Density of Events is the sum of the numerical values that denote the Significance of 
each Event at a point in time. For time periods 1, 2, and t, Total Density (TD) is 
calculated as follows:  
TD1 = S1 + S2 + S3 + ￿+ Sn 
TD2 = Sn+1 + Sn+2 + Sn+3 + ￿.+ Sn+m 
TDt = [￿￿] + Sq 
 
Where q represents the Significance of the last event counted for period t. 
The impact of Events diminishes over time. To reflect this, a discount rate should be 
applied to the Total Density of a given period in each subsequent period. The discount 
rate applied should in addition reflect subsystem specifics and peculiarities. 
Cumulative Total Density (CTD) is calculated by adding the (discounted) Total 
Density values over time:  












   where δ is the discount rate. 
CTD over time may be charted to determine whether and how it corresponds with the 
intuitively determined transition phases of predevelopment, take-off, acceleration, and 
stabilization. This exercise would allow for ￿testing￿ the transition hypothesis in the 
waste management subsystem. The methodology described here does carry a heavy 
burden of subjectivity. Grounding this methodology requires careful examination of 
historical data in waste management including the volumes of waste generated, 
recycling, and incineration, for example, and their relationships with the changes in 
such variables as the GDP or consumption patterns. Accompanied with the 
corresponding Cumulative Total Density trend, the charting of quantitative historical 
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data can demonstrate how, as well as why, the waste management subsystem has 
evolved in the manner it has in the Netherlands. 
5. Conclusion 
Institutional configurations should be viewed as nested, hierarchical structures that 
evolve over time and in response to the impact of endogenous and endogenous 
variables. Certainly, meaningful institutional analysis requires making simplifications 
and assumptions regarding the endogenous and exogenous factors that affect the 
phenomenon or situation under study. The frameworks discussed in this paper, as well 
as the framework offered for evolutionary institutional analysis in the preceding 
section, all make such simplifications. Key to assessing the usefulness of an analytical 
framework is ensuring that the assumptions remain valid and adequate throughout the 
analysis. Thus the assumptions and simplifications that underlie the proposed 
framework need to be continuously and rigorously reviewed after each case study and 
revised as and when necessary to reflect subsystem specific peculiarlities. 
This paper has been concerned with understanding how and why transitions occur and 
what the implications are for policy-making. From a systems perspective it can be 
argued that transitions in a subsystem occur as a result of the co-evolution of a set of 
slow subsystem changes over time coinciding with significant endogenous and 
exogenous events. Key to understanding the dynamics of such changes are the 
institutions through which events are embedded and which regulate inter-relations at 
different levels. Given the centrality of institutions in determining the evolutionary 
path of the economic activity, it is of crucial importance to capture the multiplicity of 
institutional forms that result from the confluence of endogenous/exogenous variables 
and the already existing institutions within a recognizable frame of reference and to 
determine the levels at which these institutions operate. 
A typology of institutions is suggested here as a loose but structured means of 
compiling an inventory of institutions for the subsystem under study. This typology is 
to be used in conjunction with a methodology to rank events which bear upon the 
subsystem and transform many of institutions, while creating new ones, and 
strengthening others. The proposed framework allows for investigating the links 
between the evolution of the subsystem￿s institutions over time in response to the 
occurrence of endogenous and exogenous events of varying importance. The 
methodology in addition calls for attributing quantified significance levels to events 
so as to isolate the key variables of the subsystem and to establish the extent to which 
these variables may be controlled.
16 
 
                                                           
16 The framework presented in this paper is currently being applied to the Dutch waste management, 
the Swedish mobile telecommunication, and the European pulp and paper subsystems.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Social Fabric Matrix 


















1￿n         
Social Belief 
1￿n         
Pers.  Attitude 
1￿n         
Personal Taste 
1￿n         
Environment 
1￿n          
Technology 
1￿n         
Institutions 
1￿n         
Source: After Hayden 1993 
 
 
Table 2. Examples of Components and Elements 
Component Elements 
Cultural Values 
Domination of nature by humans, atomistic conceptualization, extensive 
hierarchical relationships, (Newtonian concept of) flowing time, divine creation, 
dualistic thought, dynamic expansiveness 
Social Beliefs  Statutes, agency rules, regulations, operation procedures, work ethics, property 
rights, compassion, redistribution, reciprocity, exchange 
Personal Attitudes  Frugality, communitarianism, racism, consumerism, environmentalism; anti-
environmentalism 
Personal Tastes  Preference based on fashion, gender, class 
Natural Environment  Air, water, soil, flora and fauna 
Technology  Tools, skills, knowledge 
Social Institutions  Kinship, marriage, habits, rules, courts, government and its agencies, industry 
and its agencies, interest groups, religions, market, money,  
   24
 
 
Table 3. “Simplification” of the Policy Process for Institutional Analysis 
Analytical Framework  Main Characteristics 
Institutional Rational Choice¹  
(including IAD) 
•  Institutions are viewed as ￿constraints￿ on the exercise of choice ￿ the range and 
number of available choices are determined by the institutional context, e.g., voting 
rules, committee procedures, rewards and punishments 
•  Focus is on leaders of a few critical institutions with formal decision making authority 
•  ￿Leaders￿ pursue their own material self-interest 
•  Actors can be grouped into a few institutional categories 
Advocacy Coalition 
Framework ² 
•  Belief systems are more important than institutional affiliation 
•  Actors ￿learn￿ and periodically change their belief systems and revise strategies 
•  Actors may be pursuing a variety of objectives 
•  Researchers and journalists (in addition to politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens groups) 
are potentially significant policy actors 
•  Changes in the core aspects of a policy are usually the results of changes in non-
cognitive factors external to the policy subsystem, e.g., the macro-economic or political 
conditions 
•  The policy process has to be studied over a period of a decade or longer 
Policy Streams Approach ³ 
•  ￿Messiness￿ of the policy process is taken as the baseline 
•  ￿Policy formation￿ and change are products of a coming together of problems, policies, 
politics, and random events creating opportunities for new ideas 
•  ￿Policies￿ are proposed and lobbied for by ￿policy entrepreneurs￿, e.g., politicians, 
bureaucrats, analysts, consultants, journalists, and academics.  
•  ￿Politics￿ are political processes such as elections and their aftermaths or the role of 
￿regulatory￿ factors, e.g., pressure groups, in agenda formation, awareness raising, and 
learning. 
Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework 
4 
•  ￿Physical / material conditions￿, ￿Attributes of Community￿, and ￿Rules-in-Use￿ 
constitute the starting point in the analysis 
•  ￿Action Arena￿ is the unit of analysis, consisting of ￿action situations￿, e.g., an 
environmental problem, and ￿actors￿ (individuals and organizations) 
•  Individuals are ￿fallible learners￿ capable of making mistakes and learning 
•  Learning depends on the availability of incentives and opportunities in ￿institutional 
arrangements￿ 
•  ￿Patterns of Interactions￿ among actors of an action situation generate ￿outcomes￿ 
whose evaluation against predetermined societal criteria provides feedback for the 
various stages of the policy process 
Network Analysis / Social 
Fabric Matrix 
5 
•  Focus on (formal and informal) relationships among decision makers within the same 
policy domains 
•  Networks exist either, to build relationships for mutual advantage (Helco 1978), or to 
act as coordinative devise for the policy domain to respond to change and to resist or 
co-opt destabilizing demands (Browne 1995) 
•  Networks may be ￿mapped￿ to highlight the key nodes (Hayden 1998) 
•  Density and resilience of relationships within a network may be measured to postulate 
on the behaviour of the network and its members 
¹ Shepsle (1989); Scharpf (1997); Ostrom (1986, 1990);  ² Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999);  ³ Kingdon 
(1995 [1984]); John (1998);  
4 Ostrom (1999);  
5 Hayden (1982a,b,c; 1993; 1998) 
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Table 4. Types of Institution 
Institution Type  Examples  Direction of 
Régulation 
Associative: Institutions as mechanisms 
facilitating prescribed or privileged 
interaction among different private and 
public interests 
Business Networks; Kinship Groups; 
Social Classes; Associations; Interest 
Groups  Member ↔ Member 
Behavioural: Institutions as 
standardized (recognizable) social habits 
￿ manifested in activities of individuals 
and groups as reflections of widely 
accepted and expected social norms 
Habits; Routines; Ways of Doing 
Things; Shared Beliefs; Theories in 
Use  Individual → Society 
Groups → Society 
Cognitive: Institutions as mental models 
and constructs or definitions ￿ 
manifested primarily in what society 
expects of individuals or groups 
Deeply held Cultural and Social 
Values; Perceptions of Good and 
Bad; Superstitions; Wisdom 
Individual ← Society 
Groups ← Society 
Constitutive: Institutions setting the 
bounds of social relations through 
systems of coercion and sanction 
Collective Actions initiated by the 
State Agencies, Firms, Unions, or 
Citizens Groups; Language; Property 
Rights Structures; Agreements; 
Arrangements; Marriage 
Individuals ↔ Individuals 
and  
Groups ↔ Groups 
Regulative: Institutions as prescriptions 
and proscriptions to constitute new 
social relations 
Written and Unwritten ￿Rules of the 
Game￿; State as Rule Maker, 
Referee, and Enforcer  
Society and State 
↓ 
Individuals and Groups 
Adapted from Parto (2003a) 
 
Table 5. Institutions of the Dutch Waste Management Subsystem 
Institution Type  Catalyst Event  Direction of 
Régulation 
Associative: Institutions as mechanisms 
facilitating prescribed or privileged 
interaction among different private and 
public interests 
Policy networks around air and water 
issues (1970s-present); Citizens￿ and 
Producers￿ networks to define waste 
management policy on packaging, 
collecting, separating, recycling, 
incineration, and landfilling 
Member ↔ Member 
Behavioural: Institutions as 
standardized (recognizable) social habits 
￿ manifested in activities of individuals 
and groups as reflections of widely 
accepted and expected social norms 
Recycling and domestic and 
industrial waste separation by 
individuals or groups of individuals 
(1970s-present) 
Individual → Society 
Groups → Society 
Cognitive: Institutions as mental models 
and constructs or definitions ￿ 
manifested primarily in what society 
expects of individuals or groups 
Liberalized markets (1980s); 
Formalized Producer responsibility 
(1990s); Lansink￿s Memorandum 
(1979) 
Individual ← Society 
Groups ← Society 
Constitutive: Institutions as entities 
setting the bounds of social relations 
through systems of coercion and 
sanction 
Governmental environmental 
departments (1970s); Organizational 
waste management divisions (1980s); 
NMP+ (1980s, 1990s, 2000); 
Lansink￿s Ladder (1980s);  
Environmental audits (1990s); 
Liberalized waste markets (1990s); 
Formalized Producer responsibility 
(1999); National Waste Plan (2000) 
Individuals ↔ Individuals 
and  
Groups ↔ Groups 
Regulative: Institutions as prescriptions 
and proscriptions to constitute new 
social relations 
Surface water and air pollution 
legislation (1970s); Covenants 
(1980s, 1990s); Incineration 
guidelines (1980s) 
Society and State 
↓ 
Individuals and Groups   26
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Transitions as Changes in Subsystems 
A B  C 
 
Adopted from Kay (1991) 
 
 




                   P a t h   3  
         
                          P a t h   2  
         






         T i m e  






Arthur, B. (1990). "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy," Scientific American 262 (February): 
92-99 
Barley, S.R. and P.S. Tolbert (1997). ￿Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the 
Links Between Action and Institution￿, Organization Studies 18: 93-117 
Bill, J.A. and R.L. Hargrave, Jr. (1981). Comparative Policy: The Quest for Theory 
(Washington, DC: Bell & Howell, University Press of America) 
Brenner, N. (1998). ￿Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and 
the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales.￿ Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 16(1): 459-481 
Boyer, R. (1979). ￿Wage Formation in Historical Perspective: The French Experience￿. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 3, 99-118 
Bush, P.D. (1987). ￿The Theory of Institutional Change￿. Journal of Economic Issues. 21 
(September), pp. 1075-1116. 
Commons, J.R. (1950). The Economics of Collective Action (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press) 
Dewey, J. (1954). The Public and its Problems (Chicago: The Swallow Press). 
DiMaagio, P.F. (1988). ￿Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory￿, in L.G. Zucker (ed.) 
Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment (Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger), pp. 3-21 
Dunford, M. (1990). ￿Theories of Regulation￿. Environment and Planing D: Society and 
Space 8:3, 297-321 
Eckstein, H. (1963). ￿A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present￿, in Eckstein, 
H. and D.E. Apter (eds.) Comparative Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe), pp. 
3-32 
Eden, L. and F.O. Hampson (1997). ￿Clubs are Trumps: The Formation of International 
Regimes in the Absence of a Hegemon￿, in Hollingsworth, J. and R. Boyer (eds.) 
Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press), 361-394 
Foster, J.F. (1981a). ￿Syllabus for Problems of Modern Society: The Theory of Institutional 
Adjustment￿. Journal of Economic Issues. 15 (4), 929-35. 
Foster, J.F. (1981b). ￿The Fundamental Principles of Economics￿. Journal of Economic 
Issues. 15 (4), 937-42. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). ￿Economic Action and Social Structure￿. American Journal of 
Sociology, 91:3, 481-510. 
Hall, R.H. (1992). ￿Taking Things a Bit Too Far: Some Problems with Emergent Institutional 
Theory￿, in K. Kelly (ed.) Issues, Theory, and Research in Industrial Organizational 
Psychology (Amsterdam: Elsevier), pp. 71-87 
Hayden, F.G. (1982a). ￿Project Evaluation in a Futures Real Time System.￿ Journal of 
Economic Issues 16 (2), pp. 401-11. 
Hayden, F.G. (1982b). ￿Social Fabric Matrix: From Perspective to Analytical Tool.￿ Journal 
of Economic Issues. 16 (3), pp. 637-61. 
Hayden, F.G. (1982c). ￿Organizing Policy Research Through the Social Fabric Matrix: A 
Boolean Digraph Approach.￿ Journal of Economic Issues. 16 (4), pp. 1013-26.   28
Hayden, F.G. (1987). ￿Evolution of Time Constructs and Their Impact on Socioeconomic 
Planning.￿ Journal of Economic Issues. 21 (3), pp. 1281-1312. 
Hayden, F.G. (1991). ￿Instrumental Valuation Indicators for Natural Resources and 
Ecosystems￿ Journal of Economic Issues. 24 (4), pp. 917-35. 
Hayden, F.G. (1993). ￿Institutionalist Policymaking￿, in Tool, M.R. (ed.) Institutional 
Economics: Theory, Method, Policy (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 
283-331. 
Hayden, F.G. (1994). ￿Institutional Theory and Public Policy￿, in Hodgson, G.M., W.J. 
Samuels, and M.R. Tool (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary 
Economics (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited), pp.392-397. 
Hayden, F.G. (1998). ￿Normative Analysis of Instituted Processes￿, in Fayazmanesh, S. and 
M.R. Tool (eds.) Institutionalist Theory and Applications: Essays in Honour of Paul 
Dale Bush (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited), pp. 89-107. 
Hayden, F.G. and K. Stephenson (1992). ￿Overlap of Organizations: Corporate 
Transorganization and Veblen￿s Thesis on Higher Education￿ Journal of Economic 
Issues. 26 (1), pp. 53-85. 
Hirsch, P.M. (1997). ￿Review Essay: Sociology Without Social Structure: Neoinstitutional 
Theory Meets Brave New World￿ American Journal of Sociology 21:1702-23  
Hodgson, G. M. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional 
Economic. (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Hodgson, G. M. (1993). Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back into Economics. (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press) 
Hodgson, G. M. (1999). Economics and Eutopia: Why the learning economy is not the end of 
history. (London: Routledge). 
Hollingsworth, J. and R. Boyer (1997), eds. Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of 
Institutions. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press).  
Jessop, B. (1997). ￿The Governance of Complexity and the Complexity of Governance: 
Preliminary Remarks on Some Problems and Limits of Economic Guidance￿, in Amin, 
A. and J. Hausner (eds.) Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and 
Social Complexity (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar), pp. 95-128 
John, ￿P. (1998). Analyzing Public Policy (London: Pinter) 
Kay, J.J. (1991). ￿A Non-equilibrium Thermodynamic Framework for Discussing Ecosystem 
Integrity￿, Environmental Management, 15 (4): 483-495   
Kay, J.J. (1994). ￿Some notes on: The Ecosystem Approach, Ecosystem and Complex 
Systems and State of the Environment Reporting￿, (Waterloo, ON: University of 
Waterloo) 
Kingdon, J. (1984[1995]). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown). 
Kemp, R. (1994). ￿Technology and the Transition to Environmental Sustainability: The 
Problem of Technological Regime Shifts￿, Futures 26(10): 1023-1046  
Kemp, R., J. Schot, and R. Hoogma (1998). ￿Regime shifts to sustainability through 
processes of niche formation: the approach of strategic niche management￿. 
Technology analysis and strategic management 10 : 175-196  
Liebowitz, S.J. and S.E. Margolis (1995). "Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History." Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization 11: 205-226   29
March, J.G. and P.J. Romelaer (1976). ￿Position and Presence in the Drift of Decision￿, in 
J.G. March and J.P. Olsen (eds.), Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen, 
Norway: Universitetforlaget), 251-276. 
Mattessich, R. (1978). Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology: An Epistemology 
of the Applied and Social Sciences (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing 
Co.). 
Munkirs, J.R. (1985). The Transformation of American Capitalism: From Competitive 
Market Structures to Centralized Private Sector Planning, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe) 
Myrdal, G. (1957). Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. (London: Duckworth) 
Neale, W.C. (1987). ￿Institutions￿. Journal of Economic Issues. 21 (3): 1177-1206 
Nelson, R. R. (1995). ￿Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change￿. Journal of 
Economic Literature. 33:1, 48-90. 
Nelson, R.R. and Sampat, B.N. (2001), "Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor Shaping 
Economic Performance", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44:31-54 
Nicolis, G. and I. Pregogine (1977). Self-Organization in Non-equilibrium Systems, (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons) 
Nicolis, G. and I. Pregogine (1989). Exploring Complexity, (New York: W.H. Freeman) 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Oliver, C. (1991). ￿Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes￿. Academy of Management 
Review 16:145-79 
Ostrom, E. (1986). ￿An Agenda for the Study of Institutions￿. Public Choice, 48 3-25 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press) 
Ostrom, E. (1999), ￿Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional 
Analysis￿, in Sabatier, P.A. (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder CO: 
Westview Press), pp. 35-73 
Parto, S. (2003a). ￿Economic Activity and Institutions: Taking Stock￿, MERIT-Infonomics 
Research Memorandum Series (2003-007). 
Parto, S. (2003b). ￿Sustainability and the Local Scale: Squaring the Peg?￿, MERIT-
Infonomics Research Memorandum Series (2003-0017). 
Parto, S. and D. Doloreux (2003). ￿Public Policy and Sustainable Development: Agenda (21) 
for Change?￿, MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum Series (2003-018). 
Perrow, C. (1961). ￿The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations￿. American 
Sociological Review 26: 151-55 
Polanyi, K. (1957). ￿The Economy as Instituted Process￿, in Polanyi, K., C.M. Arensberg, 
and H.W. Pearson (eds.). Trade and Market in the Early Empires (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery) 
Rip, A. and R. Kemp (1998). ￿Technological Change￿, in Rayner, S. and E.L. Malone (Eds.), 
Human Choice and Climate Change, (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Press), 327-399 
Rotmans, J., R. Kemp, and M. van Asselt (2001). "More evolution than revolution: Transition 
management in public policy." The Journal of Futures Studies, Strategic Thinking and 
Policy. 3:15-31 
Sabatier, P.A. and H.C. Jenkins-Smith (1993) eds. Policy Change and Learning: An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder CO: Westview Press).   30
Sabatier, P.A. and H.C. Jenkins-Smith (1999). Frameworks Focusing on Policy Change over 
Fairly Long Periods￿, in Sabatier, P.A. (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder 
CO: Westview Press). 
Sayer, A. (1999). "Long Live Postdisciplinary Studies! Sociology and the curse of 
disciplinary parochialism/imperialism" (draft). Department of Sociology, Lancaster 
University, at: [http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc025as.html]. 
Scharf, F. (1997). Games Policy Actors Play. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). 
Scott, W.R. (2001). Institutions and Organizations, 2
nd edition, (London: Sage Publications). 
Scott, W.R., M. Ruef, P.J. Mendel, and C.A. Caronna (2000). Institutional Change and 
Healthcare Organizations: From Professional Dominance to Managed Care (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Shepsle, K.A. (1989). ￿Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice 
Approach￿. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 131-149  
Stinchcombe, A.L. (1968). ￿Social Structures and Organizations￿, in March, J.G. (ed.) 
Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally), pp. 142-93  
Stinchcombe, A.L. (1997). ￿On the Virtues of Old Institutionalism￿, Annual Review of 
Sociology 23:1-18  
Street, J. (1987). ￿The Institutional Theory of Economic Development￿. Journal of Economic 
Issues 21 (4): 1861-1887. 
Swaney, M.R. (1987). ￿Elements of a Neoinstitutional Environmental Economics￿. Journal of 
Economic Issues, 21 (4) 
Tickell, A. and J. Peck (1992). ￿Accumulation, regulation and the geographies of post-
Fordism: missing links in regulationist research.￿ Progress in Human Geography 16(2): 
190-218 
Tool, M.R. (1994). ￿Instrumental Value Theory￿, in Hodgson, G.M., W.J. Samuels, and M.R. 
Tool (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited), pp.406-411. 
Veblen, T.B. (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions 
(New York: Macmillan). 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. (New York, The Free 
Press)  
Weir, M. (1992). "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation￿, in Structuring Politics: 
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis  Steinmo, S., K. Thelen, and F. 
Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Zahariadis, N. (1999). ￿Alternative Views of the Role of Rationality in the Policy Process￿,  
in Sabatier, P.A. (ed.) (1999). Theories of the Policy Process. (Boulder CO: Westview 
Press). 
 